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is one of which the bar may well be proud. If nothing more, it has.
done much to elevate the standard of our profession, and to show
that the rugged paths of legal science may be made beautiful by the
graces of literature and humanity, at no sacrifice of practical usefulness and skill. We may point to Talfourd, as to some of the
judges who have recently adorned the Courts of this country, as an
illustrious proof that the practice (f the law need neither blunt the
-feelings nor narrow the intellect.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
THE COMMONWEALTH vs. JTOHNSTON.
1. Special pleading before a Justice of the Peace, though not to be encouraged, is not
unlawful, and when a defendant has pleaded specially, and the Plaintiff demurs to
his plea, the facts therein alleged are regularly on the record, and become substantive ground of the judgment.
2. In a conviction under the Act of 22d April, 1794, for performing worldly employment on Sunday, it should appear what the work was for which the defendant
was convicted, but as the whole record is to be' taken together, it is sufficient if
the description of the work appear in any part of it.
8. Driving an omnibus as a public conveyance daily and every day is worldly employment, and not a work of charity or necessity within the meaning of the Act of
'94, andtherefore not lawful on Sunday.
4. A contract of hiring by the month does not, in general, bind the hireling to work
on Sundays, and if his work be such as the Statute forbids, an express agreement
to perform it on Sunday will not protect him, for such a contract is void.
5. Though traveling does not in a legal sense fall within the description of worldly
employment intended to be prohibited, yet the running of public conveyances on"
Sunday is forbidden by the Statute. BLAcx, CH. J. and Lawis, J. dissenting.

The following dissenting opinion was delivered by
LEWIS, J.-In assigning my reasons for dissenting from the
opinion just pronounced by a majority, I beg to be understood
as entertaining the utmost deference for their judgment and the
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greatest respect for their zeal in the cause of religion and order.
But I cannot bring my mind to assent to their views; and I do
not believe that the object which they have at heart will be in any
manner promoted by the rigid rules of construction adopted. Religion has never -prospered by uniting itself with the State, and
leaning upon earthly princes, potentates and powers, for support.
On the contrary, it has prospered most when those powers have
been -arrayed against it. This position is so well established, that
it has grown into an aphorism, that " the blood of the martyrs is
the seed of the church." The union of Church and State can only
be brought about by mutual concessions which result in a compromise of the interests of both. In all such unions, the party. which
happens to have the most power will invade the rights of the other.
In the Sandwich Islands, where the missionary clergymen have
chief influence over the Government, it is said to be against the
law even to walk out of the house on the Sabbath day !.While in
England, where the King is the head of the Church, it was provided by statute in the reign of James the First, that the people
should not be forbidden to indulge in what was called "1such honest
mirth or recreation" as ' dancing, archery, leaping, vaulting, May
games, whitsun ales, and morris dancing" on the Sabbath, after the
hours of worship. (3 Burn's Just. 106.) And the clergy were
compelled to cause the enactment to be publicly read in the
churches. These are but illustrations of the evils of the union,
and of the unjustifiable extremes to which it leads.
In trials before an alderman or a justice of the peace, the parties
have as good a right to admit the facts and to demand judgment
upon the law of their cases as they have in trials before any other
tribunal. The statute which gives jurisdiction to the inferior
magistracy does not deprive the partiep of their legal rights in
this respect. So, that by the demurrer to the fourth plea we have
the facts of the case clearly admitted upon the record. By that
plea it is stated that the defendant was doing " a work of necessity
in this, that the omnibus to which the horses were attached is a
vehicle for the public conveyance of persons traveling from Lawrenceville to Fifth street, in the city of Pittsburg, the distance of
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* three miles, daily, including Sunday; that the defendant was hired
by the month, as adriver, by the proprietors; that he was engaged
in fulfilling his contract in the public conveyance of persons traveling between the said points on Sunday, being a work of necessity
and lawful, on that day for the purpose aforesaid." The "purposs
aforesaid" refers to the purpose stated in -the previous lleading,
which is thus made part and parcel of the fourth: plea. That purpose, as thus stated and admitted by the demurrer, is "the traveling of persons to* and from sundry churches, meeting-houses and
places of divine worship which they are accustomed -to attend on
the Lord's day, commonly called Sunday, and to and from their
houses and other places at and between said stations, to which said
passengers-are traveling upon their necessary business, and for the
performance of their religious and charitable duties, and for health
and recreation, on Sunday." It is thus admitted upon the record
that persons who were traveling in the omnibus were engaged in a
"work of necessity" and in "the performance of their religi6us and
charitable duties." It follows that unless the act of traveling is so
sinful or illegal in its nature as not to be justified by any "necessity,"
however urgent, or by any "religious or charitable duties," however
sanctioned by the laws of God and man, the judgment ought to have
been rendered in favor of the defendant below. But a different view
of the case was taken by the alderman. The driver of the omnibus
was convicted of violating the act of 1794, and he is now before us,
asking for redress.
In Comm6nwealth vs. Woyf, 3 S; & R. 48, and in Secit vs.
Uommonwealt, 3 Barr, 321, it was decided that men who conscientiously believe that Saturday is the true Sabbath, were nevertheless liable to punishment under the act of 1794 for not observing.
the first day of the week. I regret that the Legislature of this
Commonwealth have not, thus far, thought proper, to follow the
example of Christian toleration which prevails in the adjoining
States of New York, New Jersey and Ohio, in this respect. But,
under the express provisions of the act, the construction adopted
was inevitable; and in view of the Christian character and common usages of the people who established the government, there
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*is no difficulty in sustaining , the statute .as constitutional. 'It
is not necessary that a usage -should have existed from the' first
introduction of Christianity into England to give it the forcbl6f law.
'It issufficient that the usage'has been "long and immemorial, -nd
has been universally accepted.'.' This makes it a part.6f the com•mon law, which -is nothing more than common custom. By this
*long usage in the mother country, and subsequently in this Commonwealth, it is as well settlk.4 that Sunday;is regarded as a day
of rest as that wefix the date-of-events fromithe Christian 6ra, and

not from -the flight-.of -Mahomet. It.was .for this reason that- in
-1766 a judgment was. reversed because it -was entered on the Sabbath-day. (3 BT. 272; 1 :ThIst.;-856; 8 Burr. 1595; Dyer, 168;)
-That our ancestors -brought this part of -the common law withthen
at the settlement of- the -State is manifest -from their. Christiaii-pro
fessions and practices, and'rom the prQvision in the Constitution,
which excepts Sundays from-the calculation-in fixing the number of
-days allowed to the executive for-the -consideration of legislative
-,bills. (Art. 2, See. 23.)
By the general grant of legislative power, -theauthority-to conipel the observance 4 a usage which had acquired the force of.common law, and which those who-made the grant had been accustomed
to enforce-by statute, ind to consider within the limits -of-legislative
authority, may be fairly implied. But the power to abrogate that
usage and institute another.-which interferes with the rights and
violates the consciences of the people, cannot be implied -from anything contained in the Constitution. The -Sabbath is a Christian
institution, recognized liy the common law and the Constitution,
and on this ground-. alone 'havea the. Legislatqe the right to Pass
-

-

laws to enforce its observance;

They have no right to substitute

the Jewish for the Christian Sabbath, or-to prevent.the people from
pursuing their business occupations on -any other day, or on -any
number of days which they may arbitrarily designate; and I regret
that the decision in Specht vs. -The Commoealth recognized a
principle whicl seems to. admit the existence of such a power. Mr.
Justice Coulter placed that decision on the -proper ground; and,
although the opinion of Mr. Justice Burnside is not reported, his
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concurrence with Judge Coulter, and his strong aversion to the
principles adopted by the majority, are well understood. I make
these remarks because I am unwilling to admit that the Christian
usages of our ancestors have no influence upon the common law,
and I am still more unwilling to acknowledge the existence of power in the Legislature to disregard those usages, and to compel
the people to observe the customs and ceremonies of Heathens,
Jews or Mahometans, instead of them.
The Saviour, after his crucifixion and resurrection, gathered his
eleven disciples together upon the mountain in Galilee, and commissioned them to "go and teach all nations." Considering that
this was essentially the voice of God himself, it is not to be supposed that the Creator, or his chosen missionaries, were ignorant
of the law of his own creation, by which the Sabbath cannot commence and terminate with "all nations",at the same instant of
time, hut necessarily varies with the degrees of latitude and longitude. When it is Sunday morning at Jerusalem it is evening in
the Sandwich Islands. When it is Sunday at noon in Philadelphia, it is midnight in China. The tQrritory, lying between the
Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, where the commandment to keep
the Sabbath was delivered 'o the children of Israel, enjoys the alternations of day and night every twenty-four hours, while in some
parts of the Polar circles these alternations occur only once a year.
His direction to "-the children of Israel" to keep the seventh day
of the week "for a covenant," and If"as a sign between their Creator and themselves forever," therefore, couldnot have been intended
to exclude such modifications in the time and manner of observing
the day, as the necessities of other nations in different locations on
the globe, require. In view of this necessity, the fundamental principle was afrmed by'the Saviour, that "the Sabbath was made for
mart and not man for the Sabbath." The selection of any particular period of twenty-four hours was, therefore, not of vital importance. All that was required by the spirit of the institution.was
that one-seventh part of the time should be set apart for worship
and rest. The first day of the week-was the day on which God. created. the Heaven and the edrth, and was also the day on which the
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Saviour arose from the dead. That this day was substituted for the
seventh by those entrusted wvith full power to teach all nations the
new dispensation, is- a fact established by the usage introduced by
their authority and example, and continued for. eigteen hundred
years. It is, therefore, too late to raise a question in regard to the
.appropriate day. So far, at least, as this Commonwealth is coucerned, it has been. settled so long that the "memory of man ruineth not to the contrary."
Those who had authority from God to deliver the glad tidings
of salvation to mankind, and to change the day for the observauce
of .the Sabbath, had also authority from the same highsource to
direct by precept and example, the manner of keeping it. That
ttey did make a change in the mnanner of keeping the Sabbath is
as well established as that they changed te day. Under their instructions and example, it was no longer regarded as a breach of
the commandment for any man to "go out of his place on the seventh day," because the Saviour and his disciples :went About on
that day teaching) exhorting, and healing the sick. It was no
longer a capital crime to pick up food, or to "gather sticks on the
Sabbath," for those who .were hungry were allowed to .gather corn
to satisfy their wants. Num.'15: 32; Mat.. 12: 1. It was no longer
a violation of the law under all circumstances to "bear any burden"
on the Sabbath: for when the man who was healed of an infirmity
of thirty and eight years' standing, was told by the Jews that it
was not lawful for him to "carry his bed" on the Sabbath day, his
plea was unanswerable; "He that made me whole, the same said
unto me, take up thy bed and walk." Jer. 17: 21; John 5: 11. It
was no longer a crime to "kindle a fire in a habitation," Ex. 85: 3,
nor to "bake nor to seethe" on the Sabbath day, Ex. 16: 23, for
he that was the Lord of the Sabbath had declared that "the Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath." Mark 2: 27.
Even" under the elder dispensation, the injunction that no one
"should go out of his place on the Sabbath," had undergone a
modification t6 suit the. change of circumstances, and traveling on
Sunday was allowed to the extent of what was called "a Sabbath
day's journey." We are told that immediately after the ascension,
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"the disciples returned into Jerusalem from the Mount called Olivet, which is from Jerusalem a Sabbathday'8 journey." Acts 1: 12.
The Jews, with all their disposition to find fault with the Saviour
and his disciples, made no charge against them for traveling on
Sunday, for they knew that by their" own law and usage that was
allowed within certain limits. Hence their charges against the man
who was carrying his bed, and against those who went through the
corn, were not that they were .traveling, but that one-was "bearing
a burden," and the others gatheringcorn on the Sabbath.
In the spirit of the Saviour's doctrine and practices, the act of
22d April, 1794, was passed, and it certainly oughtto be expounded
by the Courts in the same spirit. In that spirit let us consider the
question before us. The act prohibits "worldly employment or
business, works of necessity and charity only excepted." Is traveling regarded as "worldly employment or business" within the
meaning of the act? The statute of 29 Carr. 2, c. 7,prohibited
the exercise of (Iworldly business, labor, or work of their ordinary
callings on the Lord's day, works of necessity and charity only excepted." But these words were not regarded as prohibiting persons from traveling in their ordinary callings, and therefore, in the
second paragraph of the statute, it was expressly provided that no
drover, horse courser, wagoner, butcher, higler, or their servants,
shall travel or come to his inn or lodging, nor shall any person use,
employ or travel with any boat, wherry, lighter or barge, without
permission from a justice. (1 Hawk. C. C. 14.) These provisions had a manifest relation to persons traveling in their ordinary
employment or business, and yet they were deemed necessary, because the words "worldly employment" in the previous part of the
statute, were not regarded as prohibiting traveling on Sunday..
This is strong evidence that the same words, as used, in the act of
1794, were not understodd as prohibiting traveling, and the oinission of the provision against it, such as is contained in the second
paragraph of the English statute, is strong evidence that the Legislature did not intend to prohibit it. In several of the States, where
it was the intention to prohibit traveling on Sunday, it has been
done in express terms. In -New York the prohibition of any "1ser-
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vile labor or working" was not supposed to include traveling, and a
distinct provision was inserted for that purpose (1 Rev. Stat. 675);
and in Massachusetts the prohibition against " any manner of labor,
busin~ss, or work,".was not deemed sufficient to embrace traveling,
and accordingly there is"
a separate provisipn on that subject in the
statute of that State (Mass. Rev. 'Stat. 385). This shows that the
act of locomotion has nbver been regarded as."worldly employment
or business," unless it be in the exercise of the 6rdinary employment of the party charged. That our own Legislature, at the time
they enacted the law of 1794, did not intend to piplhibit traveling
on Sunday, is magifst from the provision in'thenature of a judicial
exposition of the. meaning of the act.
In that proviso, it is decared thai theAct shall no.t-be construed
to prohibit the dressing of victuals (which includes the "baking
and seething" prohibited by the Jewish law,) in 'private families,
bake houses, lodging houses, 'Wins, and other "houses of entertainment, for the use of sojourners, traveers, or strangers, or to hinder
watermen from' landing their pamsenger,, or ferrymen from carrying
over the water travelers, or persons removing with their families."
If these were inserted as 'exceptions in the body of the enating
clause, the iule of "ezpressum facit cessare iaci um", might be
urged for the purpose of reducing us to the extremity of holding
that .the Sabbath *as to be otserved upon the land, but not upon
the w'ater-and that ferrymen and watermen might work at their
oars, poles, or ot.her means of propulsion, in their "worldly employment "all day, in carrying persons "over the water," and in "landing
them;" but the driver'of a stage coach or an omnibus, who allowed
them to get into his vehicle and conveyed them to their places of
destination, was guilty of a criminal violation of the law!" We
might thus be compelled to insult the. common sense of the community, .byholding that those who were landed upon the shore of a
lake or river on 'Sunday, were 'bound to remain there, exposed to
the inclemency of the weather until Monday; or, if disposed'to
adhere to the letter, and disregard the spirit' of the act, we might
adopt a construction still more objectionable, because of its injustice
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,and inequality: we might say that- the Legislature intended that
those who are rich enough to possess wagons and carriages of their
own, may-proceed on their journey; but the poor, who are only able to
pay for their conveyance in a public stage, or in an omnibus, must not
be allowed this privilege, but must remain on the shore until Monday morning! We might-declare, in the most solemn manner, that
this is according to Christian- morality, and is a true exposition of
the statute, but who will believe either the, one or the other of these
propositions? Will any one believe that the enlightened, pure and
holy teachings of the Saviour of mankind give countenance to the
idea that the rich are to be favored and the poor oppressed in this
way? It seems to me that the sanction, by a Christian Court, of a
rule of law which leads to such a result, is all' that the infidel and
scoffer at Religion could desire for theirpurpose8. That they are,
at this moment, rejoicing at the prospect before them, is aa certainas that we are considering and deciding this momentous question.
That this is but an entering wedge, And that the majority on this
bench will be forced either to carry out the principle to other cases,
or abandon it altogether, is equally certain. If carried out to all
the cases to which it necessarily applies, the interference with the
comforts of life, the molestation of peaceable and orderly citizens
in their lawful movements, and the unjust and odious inquisition.
into their motives and their private affairs, will be so intolerable as
to produce a re-action which will do more harm to the cause of Re.
ligion, than all the good it ever derived from its connection with the
State.
In the King vs. Cox, E. 32 G. 2, cited in 3 Burn's Justice,
109, it was held that "baking puddings, pies, and other such things
for dinner," was within the exception of "works of necessity and
charity," and also ".within the equity of the provi8o in favor of
baking meat." This is -an authority to show that even in 'the
construction of an exception in the act against Sabbath breaking,
we are not to be driven by intemperate - zeal into a channel so
narrow and dangerous as the mere letter of the statute, but-that in
expounding it we must be governed by the same rules which control us
in the construction of all other statutes. Whatever is within the
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equity of a statute is within the statute itself, and whatever is
within the equity of an exception is within the exception itself. As
the observance of the Sabbath is as obligatory upon the water as
upon the Zand, as the morality and good order of society is as much
promoted by enforcing its observance against ferrymen and watermen, as against coachmen and stage and omnibus drivers, and as
it would be a ridiculous absurdity, as ivell as a monstrous injustice,
to permit travelers to be carried over rivers and other streams- on
Sunday, and to be landed, but to prohibit them from leaving the
landing, although they may be cold, hungry and unsheltered, it
necessarily follows that traveling on land is within the equity of
the proviso.
But, as already stated, the proviso in our statute, is, strictly
speaking, no part of the statute itself. It is merely an appended
exposition of its meaning, so far as regards the particular cases
which are enumerated, and which we are bound to presume were
all the cases that happened to occur at the time to the Legislature.
They doubtless omitted stage coaches, because the few that were
then runnig, were employed in the transportation. of the U. S.
Mail, and it was unnecessary to make an exception in their favor,
because no one supposed that the State authority had the power to
obstruct the transportation of the mail carried under the authority
of the general government. Omnibus traveling was of course not
tkought of, because the rapid progress of our country, in her march
of improvement, had not yet brought these useful vehicles into
existence. It is true that the Legislature are not clothed with
judicial power to give a construction to acts of assembly, and therefore the proviso which expounds the statute is not binding upon the
Courts; but it serves to show that the Legislature never intended
the act of 1794 to be used for the purposes to which it is applied
in this case. Like any other exposition of the meaning of a statute,
its effect is to sanction any other acts of like character with those
enumerated. "Ratio est anima Zegi." Reason is the soul of the
law, and where-the reason is similar, the law is the same. A decision
which sanctions the carrying "over the water" and the landing of
"travelers and passengers" necessarly implies the legal propriety
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of traveling and passing, and that it is lawful to approach the shore
on the one side of the stream, and to depart from it on the other.
The provision in favor of speeding them on their way is a plain
recognition of the principle that traveling is not "worldly employment or business" within the meaning of the statute.
Five years after the statute was passed, the U. S. Circuit Court,
sitting in Pennsylvania, evinced its respect for the Sabbath by
refusing to sit on Sunday, although a jury was empanneled in a
capital case; but the same court, while the statute was fresh in the
recollection of all, permitted the jury to be taken in a carriageinto
the country for recreation. U. S. vs. 1ries, 3 Dallas, 515. In
Jones vs. Hughes, 5 S. & R., 299, it was expressly decided that
traveling wai not "worldly employment" within ,the meaning of
the act of 1794, although the transportation of merchandise as a
business, was. In Logan vs. Matthews, 6 Barr, 417, it was held,
in accordance with this principle, that the hiring of a carriage on
Sunday was a legal contract. It is true that the hiring was by a
son who intended to visit his father, but as his father was not sick,
and no unusual necessity for a Sunday visit was shown, the case
stands upon the general principle that traveling or locomotion is
not "worldly employment" within the meaning of the prohibition.,.
The eloquent remarks of the judge who delivered the opinion in
regard to the filial duties of a son to a father are but the flowers
with which that distinguished jurist was accustomed to strew his
path. If the case had been that of a visit by a father to a son-a
husband to his wife, a brother to a sister, or a lover to his intended
wife, we might have seen the .same rhetorical decorations. There
may be different degrees of urgency between the visit of a lover to
his betrothed, and that of the clergyman who comes to unite them
in marriage-between the visit of a physician to a sick patient, and
that of a minister of the Gospel to a dying sinner-between -the
quiet and orderly movement of an industrious operative who has
been confined in a close shop all week, and who takes a cheap ride
in an omnibus into the country for the purpose of healthful recreation, and the Sunday ride of a dashing young student or clerk, who
is able to hire a carriage for the purpose of paying a visit to his
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father. But the law has not authorized the atrest of- travelers on
their journeys, for the purpose of instituting an inquisition into
their motives. Such a proceeding has been regarded as so odious,
if not so froitless and impossible, that although the statute-has been
in existence more thantlhf a-century, the pw'ctiee has never beQu
sanctioned.;-bit, -on the torftrary, has been repudiated -by the courts
,and by the common -usages of the people.. The idea of stopping a
omuibus, a-stage-coach, :a steamboat, or a trainof railroad cars, for
the purpose of- ascertaining what number of -the passengerg, are
traveling for-- proper an'd necessary purposes,-and: arfesting those
who are not, is- nowfor the first time in the history of,this Commonwealth,suggested. I say that this idea is now suggested, because
there Is-no reasonable'way to enforce the. principle of the deeision
without it. It is unreasonable to arrest in their progress those who
are urged- on by the duties of attending worship, or - funeral, or
offering medical or clerical -aid to the'sick :and dyiungbecause others
are in.
the -same vehicle who.-have no such urgent -remsons for their
movements; and yet this -must-be dono if the driver of. an omnibus;,
or-the engineer- who. hbs charge of a .locoiiiotive, ii-to -bearrested,
and punished, as-is proposed'to be done'in this case., It cannot be
pretended in the .face of these repeated decisions and the uninterrupted usage of the people and the governmeit, that traveling is
"1worldly employment or business" within the .'n'edning'of the act
of 1794. Fanaticism in her wildest phrenzy has not been able to
establish this position. Thedecisions of.the Court, the uninterruptedpractice of the State government in the management of her canals
and xailroads, and the, habits of her citizens, have been in constant
opposition to it. But it~is contended that,; although the passengers
in the omnibus have a right to proceed peaceably on their way to
their churches for worship, to the cemetery to -drop a tear over the.
remains of their friends, to the country to breathe the fresh air and
recruit their health, or to any other place of destination, yet the
driver, because it is his "worldly employment," has no right to
drive the horses which ,draw the - vehicle.

And this is the pin's

point on which this great question of moral reform is to be impaled
by its own friends! Can any reasoiiable- man be misled -by such
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indirection as this? Can any one suppose it to be a sound and just
administration of the law to subvert and destroy the acknowledged
right of locomotion by such a construction ? The right is established
and acknowledged, but the means of enjoying it are cut off I -If
this principle were asserted by an obscure attorney in relation to
any other subject, it would meet with nothing .but derision. It is
contrary to a rule as old and well established as the law itself.
"Where the law doth give anything to one, it giveth implied by
whatsoever is necessary for enjoying the same." Co. Litt. 56.. The
accessories go with the principle. As traveling is lawful, the agents
who do no more than render the necessary aid in- such lawful act,
cannot be guilty of any crime. It is no answer whatever to this
objection to say, that the agents are following their "worldly
employment." The same may be said of every person employed in
supplying the necessary demands of humanity, from the physician
who assists in bringing us into the world, to the grave-digger .who
renders his aid as we go out of it. Where is this to end? The
coachman who drives an aged or sickly family of females to church,
is pursuing his "worldly employment." The hired man who takes
care of the horses and cattle of his employer, is pursuing his
"worldly employment." All the domestics who minister to the
daily necessities of a family, are pursuing their "worldly employment." Every one of these persons is as justly liable to punishment
as is the present defendant. None of them, except those who dress
victuals, are expressly mentioned in the exceptions of the statute,
nor in the proviso. Their only justification is that which ought to
sustain the defendant here. They are aiding in the performance of
acts not within the meaning of the prohibition, and are therefore
guilty of no crime. This principle was undoubtedly affirmed in the.
case of Logan vs. Thomas, 6 Barr, 417. The plaintiff was a keeper
of a livery stable, and was allowed to recover on a contract for the
hire of a horse and carriage on Sunday, notwithstanding the hiring
of the horse and carriage was in the course of his "worldly employment." The action could be sustained on no other principle than
that which ought to be equally effective as a defence here. The
proposed journey, not being unlawful, it was no crime to furnish
34
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the means necessary for performing it. So, in England, the owner
of a stage coach was held liable to an ation for neglecting to
convey a passenger on Sunday, according to contract, although the
carriage of passengers was not only his vorldly employment, but
was his "ordinary business. Sardemanvs. Breach, 7 Barn. &Cress.
.96.' Apply this principle to the transportation of the United States
Mail. It is conceded that the State authorities have no power to
stop it; but if it be true, as now alleged, that the lawfulness of the
act does not sanction the use. of-the necessary m'eans of performing
it, we might punish the driver of the coach which contains it. And
what would this be but obstructing the United States -government
in the exercise of its legitimate functions ? If we attempted this,
our error would be corrected by the Supreme Judiciary of the Union
without the least hesitation. We would'soon be made to understand
that the right to a thing carries with itthe right to all the necessary
means of enjoying it. Why, then, shall we not apply the 'same
principle to the case before us? The right to go from Lawrenceville
to Pittsburg is not denied. The right to the means of performing
the journey must therefore be undeniable.
Now, that the selling- of liquor on Sunday is prohibited, there
can be no great evil in permitting the laboring mat, whose health
is exhausted by toil and close confinement in the dust and impure
air of his shop, to take a cheap ride in an omnibus into the country,
where his health and spirits maybe renewed by the fresh air that
he breathes, and the green fields that delight his eye and rejoice
his heart. This is a luxury that is not denied to the rich man
(although he stands in less need of it), because he can go in his own
carriage. Why, then, shall it be denied to the poor man, to whom
it is 'more than a luxury? I cannot sanction a construction which
,
leads to such injustice, partiality and oppression.
avoid
all
unnecessary
Christian
to
I would recommend it to every
traveling on Sunday; but if the steamboats, railroad cars, post
coaches and private carriages are permitted to run on Sunday-if
the National and State governments sanction the running of cars
and coaches on that day, I see. no reason for denying the owner of
the omnibus the same privilege. Let equal an exact justice be
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administered to all. Let us not, in our zeal for the cause of religion.
and morals, run ahead of all knowledge and understanding. Let
us not, by judicial legislation, enact a new law which never had any
existence before. Lt us give no countenance to a principle of
construction which is unreasonable in itself, and which tends to
favor the rich and to oppress the poor.
I concur with the Chief Justice in the opinion that the judgment
of the alderman ought to be reversed.

Court of Appeaqof the Sate of New York, April, 1854.
3OHN HENDRICKSON JR., PLAINTIFP IN

ERROR S. THE PEOPLE, DEFEND-

ANTS IN ER2ROR.
1. The testimony of a person examined as a 'witnessbefore a coroner's jury, such person not being at the time under arrest, or charged with crime, may es given in
evidence against him, on 'his subsequent trial for the alleged murder of the de,
'ceased.
2. The witness n such case, stands on the same footing as the witnesses examined on
the trials of issues. He is not bound to crininate himself, and may decline t
answer as to whatever tends, to do so; but if he fail to avail himself of his prliilege, his answers will be deemed voluntary, and may be given in evidence
against him. It is only when he is compelled to answer after having declined
to do so, that the answer will be deemed compulsory and will be excluded.
3. On the trial of a prisoner for, the murder of his wife, the prosecution was permitted to introduce in evidence, the will of the father of the deceased, by which
it app.eared that the testator devised all his property to his wife for life, and
after her death, to his three children; the son to take one half, and the deceased
and her sister, each one fourth, .eld: that .mch evidence was properly admitted,
as bearing upon -the question of motive.

The prisoner was convicted at the Albany Oyer and Terminer,
of the murder of his wife, and on writ of error to the Supreme.
Court the judgment, -was affirmed. The case was then removed by
writ of error to this Court. The questions relied upon, are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the Court.
JT K. Porter,for plaintiff in Error.
. Harrio, (District Attorney,) for defendant in Error.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
PFKSR, J.-The wife of Hendrickson died on Sunday, the 6th
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of.March,: On th.e evening of the next day a coronerls;inquest was
held, b.efore which Hendrickson was sworn ,and.lexamined as.a witness. He stated.the circumstances attendivig the deth bfhiis -wifew
When interrogated as.to his. having -been -in Albany,,ie .said he had
been' there "twowee k s ago last Saturday;" ahd. whenA sked-.if.he
had not been there since, he said, "Oh. yes$ I believe "was, 'a week
ago last Saturday," as if corkecting'himself; and oiifbeing further
interrogated, said, "I was, last Saturday." :He-furtherstated the
object of his going to Albany, and mentioned several placps in the
city where he had been, but said he did not remember having been
into Springsteed's drug, store .orany other drug stoze.
Upon the..trial at the .Oyer and Terminery:tte counsel for the
prosecution offered to prove" the statement so made at the coroner's
inquest. TheCounsel for th q.priser.o j.epted.tp.t..e. .dence, ox
the grPund thAt what -the prisoner swore to on Ahat occasion was
not a voluntary statement. The objeetion was Overruled and- 6
evidence received, to 'which the counsel for the prisoner excepted;
addtheallegea erroneousness of that decpion const tites'4e first
.ground on which the prisoner relies for a reversal of the judgment.
I. The general rule is,.-that all a party has said which is televant
to the questions involved in the trial, is' admissible in "evidence
against him. The exceptions to this rule are where the confessIou
'has been.drawn from the prisoner by .means- of a threat o a
promise, or whore it is not voluntary, because obtained compulsorily
or by improper influence. It is not claimed in this case; that the
statement in question was obtained by means of any promis.e or
threat or by any inducement whatever; nor is it supposed that
there was' any. coiqpulsion- or any influenice affirmatively exereised
upon.,the mind-of the prisoiier .beyond "-.hat-'isought to be inferred, from-the fact that he vas required to -testify as. a-witftsa.
But it is contended that bebahse he, was- 66 reqr 1to {estify; upon
a general inquiry into the- cause of the' death of"his wife liis-statement was not voluntary and should' have been 'excluded. 'The
record shows that the objectibn at the-trial was placed-only on the
ground that the statenient wa" Aiot volunthry.
Hendrickson was. not in .. 4s ody Hp.0..
no. objection. to
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being sworn as a witness .or to answering'any question-that was Viut
to him. He was treated, in every-respebt, like the other witnesses.
At the time of his examination, no circumstances had been',developed warrauting a suspicion against -him. The pistimortem: eamination did not take place till -the neit day, and it~was not'ukil
the second day after his testimoii. befoke the corner's inquest, that
he was arrested: under a warrant issued, 1not by ther coroner, but by
a police justice of the citjr of Albany. His staiementas awitness
was in no respect'an admission of guilt. On the:contrary it was a
deniaf of material facts attempted, on his triali to be established. by
other witnesses. His, testimony was calculated to'ward off. suspicion from himself, not to attract it towards -him.
The question presented, therefore, -is, whether, under the circumstances, the statement-of a witnesi-is tobe excluded on-the ground
that it was not voluntarily made.
Several-English niWi prius decidibns Were titedon the argument,

which it is necessary to examine.
Merceron'8 case, 2 Starkie R_ 866, .decided in 1818,'was ,an
indictment against. a magistrate for having corruptly and improperly granted 'licenses to public: houses which -were his own 'property. Abbot, J., permitted the prosecution:to prove what the;defendant had said in the course of .his examination before- a.committee of the House of Commons, appointed for the purpose of; enqutring into the police of -the metropolis, though it "wasobjected that
the statement, had been made under a compulsory process frow-'.Ae
House of Commons, and that. the deolaratom Verb bot -voluntary.
In the c'ase of Raworth, 4 Ca-ir. & Payne, 254, decided in 1880,'
it appeared that before the ,prisoner was ehirged- or- suspectea, a
person named Shearer had been examined on the'*bhargc of forgery;
and that the prisoner was called as a Witness'against Shearer and
his deposition taken. The counsel for te prosecution proposed to
read this deposition as evidence against Haworth, which -was ob:jected to. .'Justice 'Parke said, "-I think that I ought to receive
this evidence. The -prisoner was 'not,' when he made this deposition, charged with -ny offence, and -he might, on that as well as on
any other occasion when called-as-a- witndss; have objected to an-
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swer any question which might have a tendency to expose him to a
criminal charge, and not having done so, his deposition is evidenc.against him.
In a note -bythe. reporter to this case it is said, that in a case
tried at Worcester, where it appeared -that a coroner's inquest had
been held on the body of A, and it not being suspected that B was
at al. concerned in the. murder of A, the coroner had examined B
upon oath .asa witness. Parke J., would not allow the deposition
of B so faken on oath on the coroner's inquest .to be read in evidence, on the trial of an indictment afterwards f6ufid against B for
the same murder.
I cannot find this anonymous case is anywhere reported, more
faully.' It would be much more satisfactory to know the particular
circumstances of the case and the grounds. for the decision. Without them, it is entitled to but little weight as authority. And so it
seems to.have been viewed by Littledale, J., in the cse of 1ez vs.
Clewes, tried before him during the same year, ad reported as to
other points in 4 Carr. & P. 221. In Mr. Greaves' note w
.2Russ. on Crimes, 860, 7 Am. ed., on the authority of his m anuscript notes, he says the grand jury asked Littleaile, J. "can evidence of a prisoner who was examined on oath before the coroner
as a 'witness; be admitted as evidence against .the. same person,
when subsequently indicted for the murder of the person on whose
body the inquest was held? Littledale, J., answered inthe affirmative; when, the case referred to in the anonymous jioto being mentioned, the Judgo (Littledale) directed the grand jury to receive
the evidence and leave the point for discussion on the trial.
T ubS'8 case 5 Carr. & P. 580, tried in 1833, was an indictmentfor burglary. Andrews, for the prosecution, proposed to: read
a statement made upon oath by the prisoner, at a time when he
was not under any suspicion. Pendegrast objected that it was a
violation of the rule of law, which held that a prisoner should not
be sworn. Vaughan, B. said, "I do not see any objection to its
being read, as no suspicion attached to the pirty at the time. The
question is, is it the statement of the prisoner under oath ? .Clearly
it is not, for he was not a prisoner at the time he made it.".
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In Rez vs. Lewis, 6 Carr. & P. 161, decided also in 1883,
several persons, one of whom was the prisoner, were summoned
before the committing magistrate touching the poisoning of 0. No
person was then specifically charged'with the offence. The prisoner
was sworn and made a statement, and at the conclusion of the examination she was committed for trial. It was held that this statement was not receivable in evidence against the prisoner. Gurney, B.
said this case was quite distinguishable from that of Rez vs. Tubby,
and that, under the circumstances, he should have agreed with his
Brother Vaughan. "But (he said) this being a deposition made
by the prisoner at *the same time as all the other depositions on
which she was committed, and on the very same day on which
she was 6ommitted, I think it is not receivable. I do not think
this examination perfectly voluntary. It has been supposed
the prisoner was brought before the magistrate on a charge or
suspicion of guilt; but Mr. Greaves says in his notes (2 Russ. on
Cr. 857, 7th Am. Ed. note n), that he was counsel in this case, and tha4
the prisoner was summoned in the ordinary way, as a person who
could give some evidence touching the matter and not because any
suspicion attached to her.
In Rex vs. Davis 6 Carr. & P. 177 .also decided in 1883, the
daughter had been examined as a witness before the committing
magistrate against her father, and was then committed as a joint
receiver of stolen.goods with him. Her statement was excluded as
evidence against her on her trial by. Gurney, B; on the same
ground as in Bex vs. -ewis. In regard to this case, Mr. Greaves
says, (2 Russ on Cr. 857, note n. 7th Am. ed.) that the ground of
the decision was, not that there was a suspicion in the mind of the
magistrate, or even that the prisoner might be aware that there.
was such a suspicion, but that the prisoner had been examined on
oath as a witness, and says, that after the decision in the late case
of Rez vs. 'Wheater, (to which I shall refer hereafter,) it may be
doubtful whether that was a sufficient reason for rejecting the deposition.
In Regina vs. Wheeley, decided in 1888, 8 Carr & P. 250, a
party, who was charged with murder, made a statement before the
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coroncr at the inquest, which was taken down. The paper purported that the statement was made. on oath. Alderson, B. held
on th. trial of the party for murder, that the statement was not receivable, and that parol evidence was not admissible to show that
no oath in fact had been administered to the prisoner. If this was a
case of the examination of a prisoner, and not of a witness, as it
has been understood to be by commentators, (2 Russ. on Or. 855, and
860 and notes,) its correctness will not be questioned, and it -can
have no bearing upon the question now before us.
The next case, in order of time, was Regina vs. "Wleater,2
Moody's Crown Cases, 45, decided in 1838, which was an indictment for forgery. On the trial, before Coleridge, 5., the examiniation of the -'risoner previously taken on oath, as a witness, before
the Commissi6ners of Bankruptcy, concerning the bills alleged to
be forged, was held admissible as evidence against him. The opinion of all the Judges was desired on this point, and the case was
argued before all the Judges, except Park, J., and Gurney, B., who
held that the evidence had been properly received.
In Regina vs. Owen et al, 6 Carr & P. 83, tried in 1839,
the defendants were indicted for rape. The prosecution offered to
prove the statements made by Owen on oath at the inquest held on
the body of the person ravished, while the defendants were in
dustody. The counsel for the prisoners adinitted that- where witnesses had been examined voluntarily, their depositions might afterwards be read against them ; but objected that these defendants
irere in custody, and cited the case of Wheeley, where Baron Alderson rejected the deposition because it was on oath and taken while
in custody. But Williams, J., said: I know that my brother
Alderson did so; but I also know "that there has been a reaction in
opinion, (if I may be allowed the expression.) I shall, therefore receive*the evidence and reserve the point, if it shall become necessary." It is said that Baron Alderson, who had tried Wheeley's case,
was in the next Court at this time, and that Williams, J., had consulted with him in an" earlier part of the case. (Joy on Confessions, 62.)
In Regina vs. Owen and others, 9 Carr. & P.238, thle same
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defendants were tried in 1840, for the murder of the person ravished; and Gurney, B., refused to receive in evidence the deposition
on oath of the prisoners taken before the Coroner's inquest, though
it must have been known they had been received on the previous
trial of the same prisoners for rape. Baron Gurney, however, cited
Wheater's case, then recently tried before Coleridge, and admitted
he could not, on principle, see the-distinction between that and
some of the otker cases.
In the later cake of Regina vs. Sandys, 1 Carr. & Marsh. -45,
.decided in 1841, the prisoner was tried for murder, and Erskine, J.,
admitted in evidence, her deposition taken at the Coroner's inquesit,
and reserved the point for the consideration of the fifteen judges.
All the'decisions to which I have referred, except that in the case
of Wheater, were made at nisiprius, and their general current is
certainly in favor o.f the admissibility of the evidence in question;
but to give them or any of them much weight as authority, it is
necessary to understand the reasons that governed, and to see on
what principles they are based. Without that, decisions made at
the Assizes, necessarily without time for consultation and exaination, can avail but little in deciding a controverted question of law.
So far as the evidence was rejected on, thezground that.the statement was on oath, as in the case of Davis and others, it must now
be regarded as settled by the decision of all thejudges in Wheater's
case above cited,.that that of itself 'constitutes -no objection. Mr.
Joy in his treatise on the admissibility of confessions, reviews all
the decisions at nisiprius,apparently conflicting, and comes to the
conclusion that the decision by all the judges in Wheater's case
establishes the principle that a statement not compulsory, made by
a party not at the time a prisoner under a criminal charge, is ad-.
missible in evidence -against him, although it is made upon oath.
(Joy on Confessions, sec.'8, 62.)
It is now regarded as a well settled rule, and recognized in the
elementary books, that where a witness answers questions upon examination on a trial tending to criminate himself and to which he
might have demurred, his answers may be used for all purposes.
(2 Starkie's Ev. 50; Roscoe's Cr. By. 45.) Such answers are

HENDRICKSON

T&

TE PEOPLE.

deemed voluntary, because the witness may refuse to answer any
question tending to criminate him. (1 Green. Ev. § 225.) If,
however, he should be compelled to answer after claiming his privilege, his answer will be deemed compulsory, and cannot be given in
evidence against. him. Where the evidence offered has been rejected on the ground that
the statement was made when the prisoner was in custody charged
with crime, as in Wheeley's case, and Owen's caseit seems to me
clear that it was properly excluded. Because these were cases of
the examination of a prisoner, not of a witness. In such cases it is
a judioW examination, and it should not be on oath, and certain
precautions for the protection of the accused are always to be observed. In this State such examinations are regulated by statute.
(2 R. S. 2d pd. 794.) But neither is the statue, nor were the common law rules of which it is declaratory, applicable to any examination except that of a person brought before a magistrate on a charge
of crime. All other examinations are classified as extraudcial,
(Green. Ev. 216,) and are to be conducted like other cases of the
examination of witnesses.
It is evident that in deciding the case of Lewis, above cited, the
mind of the presiding Judge was influenced to some extent by the
supposition, that the facts peculiar to it gave'to the testimony the
character of a judicial examination; for Baron Gurney lays stress
upon the facts that the deposition was made at the same time as all
the other depositions on which she was committed, and on the same
day on which she was committed. In both these resemblances to a
judicial examination, the case of Lewis differs from that now before
us; for Hendrickson was arrested on a complaint made before a
different magistrate, and on a subsequent day. It is unnecessary,
therefore, to express an opinion as to the soundness of the reasons
given by Baron Gurney for his decision in the case of Lewis.
The examination of a witness before a Coroner's inquest bears
even less resemblance to a judicial examination than that taken
before a committing magistrate to a grand jury. A Coroner's in-quest may be held in all cases of sudden death, but an examination
before a committing magistate or a grand jury takes place on corn-
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plaint made that a crime has been committed. It is only where a
person is charged with crime and is examined with regard to the
truth of such charge, that his examination can be considered judicial.
. In the case of the Sate vs. Broughton, 7 Iredell, 96, decided in North Carolina, in 1846, where the grand jury were investigating an offence with a view to discover the perpetrator, and the person who was subsequently indicted, was examined before them on
oath and charged another with the commission of the offence, it
was held that the* examination might be given in evidence against
the piisoner on the trial of his indictment. Ruffin, Ch. J. said,
however, that if the evidence given by the prisoner had been a confession of his guilt and the grand jury had found a presentment on
it, the court would have held that it could not be given in evidence
against him. It is not material to the decision of this case to inquire whether the Chief Justice was right or not in the distinction
he made between a confession and a statement not a confession, because neither in that case nor in the one now before us, was there
any confession. Both statements tended to turn attention away
from the witness. I am inclined, however, to think the Chief Justice erred in the case of Broughton, in the reason assigned for his
decision. For the law seems to be that. the rule as to confessions
applies not only to direct .confessions, but to every other declaration
tending to implicate the prisoner in the crime charged, even though
in terms it is an. accusation of another, or a refusal to confess.
(Green. .v. § 219, note 2, and cases there cited.) But while the
decision in the case of Broughton is in accordance with the ruling
in the case before us, the reason given for that decision, if it be
erroneous, does not conflict with such ruling.
Independent of any supposed authority, I do not see how, upon.
principle, the evidence of a witness not in custody and not charged
with crime, taken either on a coroner's inquest, or before a committing magistrate or a grand jury, could be rejected. It ought
not to be excluded on the ground that it Was taken on oath. That
reason would exclude also the statements of witnesses on the trials
of issues. The evidence is certainly none the less reliable, because
taken under the solemnity of an oath. No injustice is done to the wit-
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ness, for he was not bound to criminate himself,.or to answei'in'regard to any circumstance tending to do so. i If itis a good ground of
exclusi6n, that the statement was made as a witness on oath, then the
rule of law that protects a witness from criiniating himself, is of
no value, and may at once be abrogated. The rule was adopted
upon the supposition that the answer might be introduced in evidence against the witness. If it cannot be, the witness has no
longer any reaqon, for •claiming his privilege. - ! Nor can the exclusion of the evidence .depend.on the.question
whether there was any suspicion of the guilt of the -witness lurking
in the breast of aiy,person at the'time the testimony was taken.
That would be the most dan'gerous of all tests, as well- because of
.the readiness with which proof of suspicion might be procured, as
of the impossibility of refuting it. Besides, the Witness mhight have
no knowledge of the existence of any suspicion, so that his mind
could not be affected or his testimony influenced by it. 'It is only
when he is charged with crime, and examined on such charge, that
there is good reason,for treating him as a party- to the proceeding.
The common law has been as tender of the rights of witnesses as "of
parties.
It is the policy of the common law never to compel a person to
criminate himself. That policy secures as well to a witness as to a
party the privilege of declining to answer. The former is supposed
to know his rights-the latter is to be specially instructed in regard
to them by the presiding magistrate. But if either fail to avail
himself of the privilege, his answer is deemed voluntary, and may
be used as evidence.
It is only upon a judicial examination, viz : in the case provided
for by statute where the prisoner is brought before a magistrate
charged with crime, that the preliminaries required by statute are
to be observed and the examination taken without oath. All other
examinations are extrajudiciaZ. The formeris the examination of
a party-the. latter of -a witness. In all cases as well before
coroner's inquests as on the trial of issues in court, when the witness is not under arrest, or is it not before the officer on,*a charge
of crime, he stands on the same footing as other witnesses. He
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may refuse to answer and his answers are to be deemed voluntary,
unless he is compelled to answer after having declined to do so; in
the latter case only will they be deemed compulsory and excluded.
Applying these rules to -the case before us, Hendrickson's answers
before the coroner's inquest were voluntary and were properly received as evidence against him.
II. The second ground on which the prisoner asks a reversal of
the judgment is that the will of Lawrence Van Deusen, the father
of the deceased, %Vas improperly admitted in evidence. The will
was dated 1st November, 1851, and by it the testator devised all
his property to his wife for life, and after her death to his thre.e
children, Lawrence Van Deusen, Maria Hendrickson, (the deceased)
and Susannah Hungerford, one moiety to Lawrence Van Deusen,
and the remaining moiety to be equally divided between Maria
Hendrickson and Susannah Hungerford. By the will, therefore,
the deceased would have received one-fourth 'part of the estate
after the death of her mother. This evidence was received as bearing upon the question of motive. If it tended, in the least, to show
that the prisoner had been disappointed in the pecuniary expectations he had entertained from his alliance with the family, in not
being able to realize them till after the death of his wife's mother,
and then not in an equal proportion with the brother; or, if it
tended to show how little property he might expect from his wife, if
she lived-in either case, whether the supposed motive was resentment or bvarice, it was properly received. It was competent to
show whether the prisoner would gain or lose by the death of the
deceased, and to compare the small amount expected to be realized
at a distant day, with the intermediate burthen of her maintenance.
Taken in connection. with theprevious testimony, tending to show a.
want of affection on the part of the prisoner towards his wife, this
evidence was clearly admaissible. Considerable latitude is allo'~ved
on the question of motive.. Just in proportion to the depravity of
the mind, would a motive' be trifling and insignificant, which might
prompt to the commission of a great crime. We can never say the
motive was adequate to the offence; for human minds would differ
in their ideas of adequacy, according to their own estimate of the
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enormity of crime, and a virtuous mind would find no motle sufficient to justify the felonious taking of human life.
I think the evidence of the will was properly received. It was
the province of the jury to determine the weight to which it was
entitled.
My conclusion is, that there was no error committed on the trial,
and that the judgment of the Supreme Court should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.

ourt of AppeaI8 of Aaryland.
IN THE MATTER OF WALSH.
1. The Benefit of 81 Charles II, oh. 2, (the Habeas Corpus Act) secured to inhabitants of MaryIsiid,'by article 8d, of Bilof Rights.
2. Act of 1809, ch. 125, sec. 2, declares, that application for Habeas Corpus may,
be made "to the Chancellor, or any Judge of the Court of Appeals, or of the
County Courts in vacation time." ITdd, that this Act applies to the Judges of
the existing Court of Appeals.
8. Tha 4th Article of the new Constitution, see. 2, provides, "That the Court of Appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction only, and the jurisdiction wiich the present Court of Appeals now has &a." Hd, That this section does not abrogate
the second section of Act of 1809, ch. 125. Qiuere, Can the Court of Appeals,
when in session, in Tirm time grant a Habeas Corpus?
4. Held, That the the Act of 1858 oh. 238, confers upon the Circuit Courts and
their Judges, such power only as the County Courts or the Court of Chancery,
while in session in term time could have and exercise, and that in this particul"a
it does not in effect repeal the Act of 1809.
5. Held, That, no individual Judge of the Court of Appeals, during the term time
of the Court, has jurisdiction to grant the writ of Habeas Corpus, that jurisdiction being expressly limited to vacation time. Also, that if this application had
been made in vacation thne, the writ would unhesitatingly have been granted.

The petition in this case, prayed for a Habeas Corpus upon the
following statement of facts upon oath, viz: "That a stranger calling himself Walsh, a student of the Roman Catholic Novitiate in
Annapolis, was forcibly'iaken out of the limits of Anne Arundel
IBefore the Hon.

J. T. Mason.
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County, to be confined in the Mount Hope Hospital for the Inisaue.
That said Walsh protested against this proceeding, declared himself
sane, appealing to persons present, for their aid and for proper
legal examination, &c."
William TVil Claude, for Petition.
The opinion of the Court was, delivered by
MAsoN, T.-An application has been made to me in my capacity,
as Tudge of the Court of Appeals, for the writ of habeas corpus8,
in the -case of an individual named Walsh, alleged to be held in
confinement at Mount Hope Hospital, near Baltimorei contrary to
law.

The first question to be determined is, have I the power under
the Constitution and laws of this State, to grant such a writ?
The effectual provision secured by this writ, against the 6ontinuance of all unlawful restraint, is classed among the absolute rights
of persons, and though prior to the Statute of 31 Charles II,
ch. 2, the judges in England awarded only in term time; yet the
peremptory provisions of that Statute conferred upon the writ the
efficacy requisite for the due protection of the liberty of the subject at all times, by requiring the judges to issue it upon proper application in vacation, as well as in term tune. The benefit of this
Statute, is secured to the people of this State by the 3d article of
our Bill of Rights, which declares "that the inhabitants of Maryland, are entitled to the common law of England, and the trial by
Jury according to the course of that law, and to the benefit of such
of the English Statutes, as existed on the 4th of July, 1776, and
which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and
other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and practised
by the courts of law or equity." This same article also declarps,
that the inhabitants of this State are entitled to the benefit of
"all Acts of Assembly in force, on the 1st Monday of November,
1850, except such as may have since expired, or may be altered by
this Constitution." And by 2d sec. of 1809, ch. 125, it is enacted
that the application for the writ of habeas corpus, may be made "to
the Chancellor, or any Judge of the Court of Appealk, or of the
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County Courts in vacation time." By 2d see. of 4th article of the
Constitution, it is provided, "That the Court of Appeals shall have
appellate jurisdiction- only, which shall be co-extensive with, the
limits of the State. It shall consist of a Chief Justice and three
asiociate justices, any three of whom sll. form a quorum, whose
judgment sliall be final and conclusive, in all cases of appeals; and
who shall have the jurisdiction which the' present Court of Appeals or this State now has, and such other appellate jurisdiction as
hereafter my be provided for by law."
Two quest tons have been raised upon the conatruction of this section of the Constitution. .First:Whether the present Court of
Appeals can exercise any other, than a strictlj appellatd jurisdiction, and as the granting of a writ of habeas .corpus is an exercise
of original jurisdiction, this Court can, when in session, in -term

time, grant it? Secondly, whether this section alters or repeals the
Act of 1800, ch. 125, which confers upon the individual.judes,
the power to issue this writ in vacation time? "Upon thefirst of
these questions I propose to express no opinion, leaving it to be decided by the Court itself, whenever the case may properly arise
before it.
As to the second question, it has been said that the provision of
the Constitution, now under review doeoxepeal the Act of 1809, in
the particulars above mentioned. But if this construction be the
true one, it follows that the Judges of the several Circuit Courts
had not, until the passage of the Act of 1853, ch. 238, the power
to issue the writ of habeas corpus in vacation time, for the language
of the 8th section of the 4th article, conferring jurisdiction upon the
Circuit Court, is almost identical, with that of the section conferring jurisdiction upon the Court of Appeals. It declares, that the
" Circuit Courts shall have and exercise in the several counties of
this State, all the power, authority and jurisdiction, which the County Courts of this State, now have and exercise, or which may hereafter be prescribed by law, and the said Judges in their respective
circuits shall have.and, exercise all the power, authority and jurisdiction of the present Court of Chancery of Maryldnd."'
This, as I understand it, confers upon the Circuit Courts, and the
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Judges thereof, such power only, as the County Courts or the Court
of Chancery,. while in session in term time, could have and exercise,
and if its effect is to repeal the Act of 1809, it necessarily follows
that the Circuit Court Judges had not the authority to issue such w
writ in vacation time, until the passage of the Act of 1858. The
consequence then, is, that until the passage of this latter Act, there
was during the vacation of the Circuit Courts, no officer, in the
State of Maryland, competent to issue the writ of -habeascorpus, a
result which would for the time, have paralysed, if not rendered
utterly nugatory, the invaluable privileges secured to every free
citizen of the State, by the 17th and 21st sections of the, Bill of
Rights. It is said' that while the new Constitution confers updn
the present Court of Appeals, the same powers exercised by the
former Court, it does not at the same time confer upon the individual members of the Court, the same powers which were exercised
by the members of the old Court; and also that the Act of 1809,
must be taken as referring to the members of the old Court of appeals a tribunal which has now no existence, and as the present
Court is aun entirely new and distinct tribunal, the language of the
law can have no application to it. If this be true, the criticism is
equally applicable to the former County Courts and the present
Circuit Court, and would lead -to the sa mie results already pointed
out, to wit: that from the organization of the new Courts, up to
the time when the Act of 1853 went into operation, a period of
nearly two years' there was no power in Maryland, to relieve
against illegal imprisonment during the vacations of the Court. A
construction fraught.with such results and imputing such intentions
to the framers of the Constitution, I cannot adopt, and I am therefore clearly of opinion, that the second section of the Act of 1809,
ch. 1256, is not in this particular, abrogated by the new Constitution, and if the application for this writ, had been made to me in
vacation, I should not have hesitated to grant it. But the Court
of Appeals is 'ow in session, holding one of its regular terms, and
whether that tribunal has power or not to grant the writ of habeas
corpus, I am clearly of the opinion, that no individual member -of
the Court has, during the term of the Court. The authority that
35
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confers upon the judges individually, the power to grant the writ
expressly limits its exercise "to the vacation time."
Upon the merits of this case; of course, I express no opiniou, but
for reasons: already assigned I must refuse the application and disthepetition. "
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1. A purchaser of stock from a trustee, with notice of the e.xistence of a

ust, ai

where it appears on the face of the certificate, takes it, subject to all equities
attching thereto.
2. A master in equity, inwhose namie, assets aie invested, has no authoiity to negotiate or transfer "y of the securities therefor which 'sie in his'possehsion or
under his cqntrol, or to change the investment, -without a special order of the
Court.
8. A master in equity is a mere depositary, and not a technical trustee.

This was a Bill in Equiiy for the delivery up of certain certificates of stocir, and for an account, &c.
As will'appear more fully from the facts stated in the decree of
the Chancellor, certain moneys then in the Court of Chancery, to
which the complainants were entitled, had been invested, by
Laurens, a Master in Equity, in the stock in question, under an
order of the Court, in his own name in trust for the oomplainants.
The certificates of this stock he had afterwards pledged to the
South-western Railway Bank, .without .authority, and had fraudulently appropriated, the money raised thereon.
From the answer of the Bank, and the deposition of its Cashier,
it appears that Laurens hviufag applied for a loan of money, had
offered, as security, certain stocks held by him as Master, informing the Cashier, that he wanted the money for the parties whose
moneys had been so invested.' On inquiry why hedid not sell the
stocks, he replied thathe would have money to invest very shortly,
and would find it difficult to get the. stocks when he wanted them;
and he wished to raise the money by a short loan, in order that he
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might invest in the same stocks when he had occasion to do so; and
that he was obliged to invest in stocks of the particular kind then
offered, and would have to buy them back again, if he sold them.
Upon these representations, of the truth of which no doubt was
entertained, the loan was effected in good faith on the part of the
Bank, and in ignorance of any breach of trust on the part of
Laurens.
It was further alleged that the order of Court, under which the
origifial investment had been made by Laurens, was a general order,
making it his duty to invest the same, until demanded by the proper authority, without any special instructions as to the time, manner, or species of investment.
The following opinion and decree were entered in the Court below,
at Charleston, by
D ARGAN, CH.-h the case of Jonathan Lucas and others, against.
William Hfume and others, by a decretal order of the Court, (March,
1840,) Catharine Simons, then Catharine Hume, as one of the heirs
at law of Mrs. Lydia Lucas, was declared to be entitled to a portion of the proceeds of the sale of a plantation called Middleburgh:
which place was then ordered to be sold by the Master, on c6rtain
terms therein prescribed. The same decree directed a distribution
of the proceeds of the sale into thirteen parts, corresponding with
the number of the heirs at law who were to receive the same ; and
also directed their shares to be paid to them respectively. In regard to the share of Catharine Hflme, (who was then an' infant,) as
well as the shares of the other infant parties, the same decree ordered them to be paid to the guardians of the said infant parties,
"if they have such guardians, and if not, to be invested by the
Master for their benefit respectively, until demanded by the proper
authority."I

In pursuance of this decree, Middleburgh, on the 6th of April,
1840, was sold by Edward R. Laurens, then one of the Masters
in Equity, to Jonathan Lucas, for $29,600. The sale was duly
reported and confirmed. The share of Catharine Hume in the
cash proceeds .of the sale was $794.10, which, by the directions of
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-the decree was invested by the said Master in 5 per cent. stock of
the City of Charleston. The certificate was No. 124, and was in
the name of "Edward B.. LTauren, Maeter in Equity, 'i trust
-forCatharineHume, a minor Mfild of Catharine Hume, formerly
'Luca#, Jeceased, or Vs assigns for $794.10, of the isaue of 1835."
The share of Catharine Hume in the credit portion of the sales,
T
afterwards received by the said Edaiard R. Laurens, was $4,887.05.
This was invested by him in a certificate of State three per cent.
stock for $7,441.53, bearing date the 16th July, 1847, in the
nmme of Edward R. Laurens, Master in Equity, in trust for Lucas
and Hume, or-his assigns.
On the 28th October, 1850, Edward R. Laurens, being pressed
for money, negotiated a loan-from the South-western Rail Road
Bank for 85;000; whidli -he secured by his individual note, and
a liypothecation of the tWo certificates above described, and another
-certiflcate of State three per cents. which stood in his name as
trustee for Susan Randall.
The'said certificates were deposited with the Bank, and endorsed
in -blank by the said Edward R. Laurens. The note of Edward R.
Laurens to the Bank was renewed several times, an the last renewal remains unpaid, in possession of the Bank. On the 19th
April* 1851, the Bank wishing to sell the stock, filled up the'blank
assignments (endorsed upon the certificates) in favor of the said
-Bank; and to be better enabled to make a sale thereof, offered
the certificates at the State and City Treasury to be transferred
in the name of the South-westorn Rail Road Bank. Before the
transfers were made, the State Treasurer and City Treasurer received notice from the complainants, and from sureties of Edward
R. Laurens'. official bond: in consequence of which the transfers
have not been made.
Catharine Hume has intermarried with William Simons, and C.
G. Memminger and Keating L. Simons are the trustees of their
marriage settlement: by which the fund in question has been as-signed to the said trustees, in trust for the uses of the marriage
settlement. And the said Bank having refused to deliver up the
said certificates of stock, the said Simons and wife and'the said
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trustees have filed this bill for an account against the said Bank,
and against the saidEdward R. Laurens, and that they be decreed
to deliver up the said certificates, &c. Catharine Simons has died
since the filing of the bill: but both the legal and equitable interest
in this fund remain in parties before the Court.
Every principle of equity applicable to the subject, demands that
the South-western Rail Road Bank should be decreed to make.
restitution. One who purchases from a trustee with notice of
the trust, becomes himself chargeable with the equities of the
trust, to the extent of his dealing, if the trustee's act is a violation, or an abuse of the trust. In this case, the Bank had notice: for the trust was unmistakeably stamped upon the face of
the certificates; and if they had followed up the indications
thereby aforded, it would have led to the*most complete infor=-.
ation on the subject, and shown them the utter incapacity of
Laurens to sell, much less to hypothecate for his own use the
certificates of stock, which stood in his name for the benefit of
the ward! of the Court. The morale of the transaction on the
part of the Bank, I do not impugn; but certainly there was great
blindness. They were deceived, but they must take the consequences. If Laurens were to be considered a mere trustee, I
should consider the plaintiffs entitled to relief.
But it is a mistake to suppose, that a Master in Equity is a trustee in the technical sense, in regard to the assets in his hands.
He is a mere depositary. He has no right or authority to make
investments, or to call in, or change, those that have been made,
without the special order of the Court. Without such authority,
he has no right to negotiate, or transfer any of the securities that
are in his possession, or under his control. Where bonds or other
securities are payable.to him, he may receive the money when due ;"
and as money is not easily identified, his misappropriation of it
might be without remedy as to the money itself. Yet even as to
the cash funds in his hands, if misappropriated, they would be followed in the hands of one, who,-in taking them, was aware of the
abuse of the official trust.

